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Abstract
We develop a model of internal constraints to show that a greater degree of initial disad-
vantage results in a higher likelihood of low aspirations and low achievement. Our model and
results are supported by evidence from anthropology, sociology and social psychology. Our
analysis suggests that internal constraints are a key ingredient in perpetuating poverty traps.
We show that a poor person will choose to restrict her cognitive window (the set of other in-
dividuals who are her role models) and study the conditions under which a role model could
alter her aspirations and achievement. We show how enodgenously chosen cognitive windows
interact with the inital distribution of status to determine whether or not a society is connected,
and hence the transmission of aspirations across individuals in that society. Our work provides
a normative justication for programs that aim at empowering disadvantaged individuals by
directly shocking their aspirations.
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1 Introduction
More than 300 million people world-wide have lived in persistent poverty in the late 1990s1 . Ac-
cording to the Chronic Poverty Report (2004-2005), 40% of the poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa and
35% of the poverty in South Asia is persistent. The probability of remaining poor over a 5-year
period is about 50% in Vietnam, 40% in Ethiopia and Philippines and 35% in India and Bangladesh.
Persistent poverty is a condition that requires an understanding of a multidimensional process which
makes people poor and keeps them poor.
An inuential literature on poverty traps argues that poverty exists and persists due to con-
straints that are external to the individual.2 Examples of such constraints are credit or insurance
market imperfections (e.g. Loury, 1981; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1991, 1993;
Torvik, 1993), coordination problems (e.g. Da Rin and Hellman, 2002; Kremer, 1993), institu-
tional or governmental failures (e.g. Bardhan, 1997), malnutrition (e.g. Dasgupta and Ray, 1986),
neighborhood e¤ects (Durlauf, 2003) or fertility decisions (Nelson 1956).
An alternative view is that internal constraints (beliefs, aspirations, self-image) are more likely
to bind for poorer individuals and, in turn, by a¤ecting her decisions (eg. responding to new
economic opportunities), could end up perpetuating poverty. "Long-run poverty is fundamentally
self-perpetuating [and] the entrapment goes hand in hand with [...] lack of hope." (Mookherjee, 2003,
p.5). Appadurai (2004, p.59)) notes that poor people may lack the capacity to aspire to "contest
and alter the conditions of their own poverty."
Both approaches have distinctive policy implications. The rst approach justies policies that aim
to relax external constraints. Financial aid, institutional strengthening, extension of property rights
or change of neighborhoods are some examples of such interventions. The second approach justies
interventions that directly alter internal constraints either to enhance the impact of interventions
that relax external constraints or more interestingly, as a means by which poor people could "contest
and alter the conditions of their own poverty." Examples of such interventions include the "classical
music orchestras for children from disadvantaged backgrounds" in Venezuela, "football for hope"
initiative by FIFA3 or "dream a dream" program in India4 and are widely used by governmental
and non-governmental development agencies worldwide.
In this paper we develop a theoretical framework that (a) explicitly models internal constraints;
1Persistent poverty is dened by the incapability to fulll basic needs during a period greater than 5 years. For
evidence on persistent poverty see Jalan and Ravallion (1998), Fouarge and Layte (2003), Biewen (2003), Duncan et.
al. (1993), among others.
2See for example Azaridis and Stachurski (2004) or Azaradis (2004) for a literature review on Poverty Traps
3http://www.fa.com/aboutfa/worldwideprograms/footballforhope/
4http://www.dreamadream.org/dreamadream/wcms/en/home/
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(b) explains how internal constraints interact with external circumstances and (c) informs on inter-
ventions aimed at altering internal constraints.
Our model is based on three central premises: rst, an aspiration level is a reference point;
second, aspirations are inuenced by peoples own actions; third, individuals do not fully internalize
the way aspirations are determined by actions. We argue that these premises nd strong support in
evidence from across the social sciences.
The intuition of our model is as follows. Think of a decision maker (DM) who, in order to
undertake a new economic opportunity, has to choose a costly action (e.g. e¤ort) with an uncertain
outcome: the action impacts on the probability distribution over nal social status. We dene
the aspiration level of the DM as the expected social status given her action and an individuals
aspiration level is a reference point that a¤ects the benet she obtains from her nal social status.
We dene a behavioral DM as one who does not fully internalize the fact that her aspirations
are inuenced by her choices. Therefore, when she chooses an action, she takes her aspirations as
given. We evaluate the decisions made by a behavioral DM against the normative benchmark of
a standard DM who chooses an optimal action accounting for the fact that her aspirations will be
endogenously inuenced by her choice of e¤ort. The resulting induced preferences of the standard
DM is dened solely on actions. A standard DM (rational choice), by denition, will end up choosing
an action and aspiring to the status that maximizes her utility: such a DM cannot be internally
constrained. A behavioral DM (boundedly rational choice), in contrast, ends up aspiring to a status
and choosing an action that may not be (and often, isnt) utility maximizing. Although aspirations
adapt to actions, since a behavioral DM takes her aspirations as given, she does not realize that she
is choosing a suboptimal action.
We show that a greater degree of initial disadvantage (measured in terms of lower initial status
of the DM) raises the likelihood that the internal constraint binds, and hence, that an aspirations
failure occurs. The underlying reason for this result is that a DM who has a low initial social status
requires higher aspirations than a DM with a higher initial status to undertake a costly action that
alters the status quo with positive probability.
Next, we examine the e¢ cacy of some well-known approaches which aim to mitigate the impact
of internal constraints. One specic mechanism that in practice that has worked particularly well
in ensuring that poor people contest "the conditions of their own poverty" is are interventions
that involve role models. One of the most remarkable examples comes from Kolkata (Calcutta),
India where the incidence of condom usage was substantially increased and the incidence of HIV
substantially decreased following interventions involving convincing and training a small group of
sex workers who would pass the important information about the use of condoms as peers education
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to their co-workers (Rao and Walton 2004)).
We rst show that a DM will restrict the set of other individuals (i.e. a "cognitive window")
whose experience/outcomes alter the beliefs of the DM about the likelihood of achieving success.
Ideally, what a DM wants to observe is someone who is identical (similarity one) to herself but with
a higher level of aspirations and achievement. If the DMs includes only those individuals who are
similar to her in her cognitive window, she is likely to observe other individuals who have similar
aspirations and make similar decisions to herself. In order to increase the likelihood of observing
an individual who has a higher degree of self-condence and therefore, has higher aspirations and
achievement she will need to include individuals who arent similar (i.e. have a higher initial social
status) to herself. However, we show that there is a limit on how far the individual will go so that,
typically, there will be individuals, with a very di¤erent initial status, who will be excluded from
her cognitive window. We show that the size of the cognitive window is larger whenever (i) the cost
of e¤ort is lower, (ii) the benet from achieving success in altering status quo is higher, and (iii)
the probability the DM attaches to achieving success is higher. Moreover, a DM with a lower initial
status has a smaller cognitive window than a DM with a higher initial status.
Our model makes explicit the importance of the interaction between external (e.g. initial status
and actual cost/benet of changing) and internal factors (e.g. beliefs and aspirations) to break an
aspirations trap. In contexts with extreme poverty and very fatalistic beliefs, changing only the
external factors may not be enough to break a poverty trap. The presence of a role model may
not be su¢ cient either in such extreme contexts, so public policies aiming at relaxing both external
and internal constraints may be needed. In less extreme scenarios, however, the sole presence of a
successful person from similar background may be enough to inspire a change of status quo, thus
breaking the poverty trap.
We nish our paper by studying the link between the distribution of initial status and the
transmission of aspirations. We show how endogenously chosen cognitive windows interact with
the initial distribution of status to determine whether or not a society is connected, and hence the
transmission of aspirations across individuals in that society. We found some subtle e¤ects. On
the one hand, when the distribution of initial social status is polarized, the society may fail to be
connected and therefore, there will be failure in the transmission of aspirations across individuals.
On the other hand, when there is perfect equality in the distribution of initial social status, either all
individuals in a society have high aspirations and seek to change their status quo or all individuals
in a society are caught in an aspirations trap. The latter is the more likely scenario if all individuals
in that society are poor to begin with.
Our model can account for a number of important patterns associated with persistent poverty.
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It also gives rise to a clear welfare standard and has novel implications for public policy. Through
an understanding of the non-trivial interaction between external and internal constraints, we show
the conditions under which the two existing approaches of poverty persistence can complement each
other.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes some important patterns
associated with poverty persistence that require formal explanation in economics. Section II lays
out and justies, with particular reference to evidence from anthropology and social psychology,
the central premises of our model. Section III presents the formal model, including how internal
constraints endogenously arise. Section IV explores the models policy implications, focusing of the
impact of role models and income distribution on aspirations and choices. Section V claries the
relationships between our model of poverty persistence and others that appear in the literature.
Section VII concludes and discusses directions for future research. Proofs of all propositions are
collected in the appendix.
2 Patterns of Persistent Poverty and Evidence of Aspirations
failure
Persistent poverty is an issue that has been of central focus in economics for several decades. In
this section, we discuss evidence that suggests, despite the plausibility of the existing explantations,
there are important aspects of this phenomenon that arent adequately accounted for. Based on a
review of the existing research on poverty persistence in social psychology, anthropology, sociology
and ethnography we make our case for the theory presented here.
Social psychologists have documented how beliefs are associated with poverty. The lack of hope
and aspirations are a typical characteristic in the personality of the poor population. Moreira (2003),
for example, studied the poor in the North-eastern Brazil and pointed out that "as the poor lose
their values, they no longer believe in themselves. They go through a process of Nihilism [denial of
hope]". Moreira provides evidence that the greatest part of the poor population has these nihilistic
characteristics, submitting themselves to the destiny that is given by God.5 Similar patterns have
been found elsewhere, for instance, in the Appalachian folk subculture (Rabow et al, 1983), in low-
income urban neighborhoods in America (MacLeod, 1995), in Jamaican male youths (Walker, 1997)
and in rural Ethiopian households (Frankerberger et al, 2007). In Ethiopia, for instance, a third of
a sample of 144 poor households believes success or failure in life is primarily the result of destiny
5Atkinson (1998) denes social exclusion as a related concept that involves agency (people may exclude themselves)
and it implies future hopes and expectations. People are excluded not just because they are currently without a job
or an income but because they have little prospects for the future.
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and/or luck. As a consequence, these households are less likely to take out larger loans and make
longer-term investments (Frankerberger et al, 2007).
The extent to which individuals believe they can control events that a¤ect them has been widely
studied in social psychology under the name of "locus of control" (Rotter, 1954). Individuals with
"external" locus of control believe that powerful others, fate or chance are the most important
determinants of events. Those with "internal" locus of control, however, believe that events result
primarily from their own actions. A behavioral DM, as dened in this paper, is consistent with
a person with external locus of control. Ceteris Paribus other personal characteristics such as
ability and intelligence, a person with external locus of control will put less e¤ort to change her
circumstances than one with internal locus of control. This is not because she wouldnt like to
change, but because she believes she has low control over the outcomes of her choices. Therefore,
external locus of control suggest the presence of a binding internal constraint and support our
denition of behavioral decisions.
Psychological studies provide evidence of an income gradient in measures of external locus of
control: poor and minorities have higher external locus of control than other more advantaged
sections of society (see, for example, Furnham 1986 and Poortinga et al, 2008). The two gures
below reect such di¤erences based on data from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England
(LSYPE, 2006):
Figure 1: Locus of control and initial dissadvantage
The above gure shows that young people from deprived backgrounds believe that external
factors have a bigger role to play in their life outcomes than their own e¤orts. Youth in the LSYPE
also demonstrate less faith in their own academic abilities, or overall intelligence as depicted in the
gure below.
6
Figure 2: Belief in abilities and initial dissadvantage
Deprived youth in the LSYPE study had the lowest academic aspirations across all income
quintiles.
Arguably, there are at least three distinct channels through which low aspirations can be linked
to poverty: the opportunity channel, the informational channel and the internal channel.
The role of the rst two channels in perpetruating poverty traps has been already extensively
examined. Could poor people have low aspirations simply because their objective opportunity set
is small (opportunity channel)? For example, a poor person may not want to aspire to be a lawyer
because she wouldnt have the funds to pay her studies. Objectively, being a lawyer is not an
achievable status for this person and it is entirely rational not to aspire to it. In this case enlarging
the opportunity set would su¢ ce for the person to aspire higher and eventually become a lawyer.
However, this opportunity channel alone is inconsistent with very recent empirical evidence from
eld experiments. For example, in Kenya, Miguel and Kremer (2004) provide evidence that only
57% of the sample picked-up the free deworming pills, which was shown to greatly improve childrens
health and school performance. Similarly, Duo (2003) documented that less than 15% of a sample
of Maize farmers in Kenya used fertilizers despite being o¤ered convenient opportunities to buy
fertilizer at reasonable prices.
The second explanation for poverty traps has to do with the view that poverty reduces peoples
aspirations due to an informational disadvantage: poor witness too few success stories in their
social milieu to learn what matters for success. This is related to the view of anthropologist Arjun
Appadurai (2004), who argues that the higher the initial disadvantage, the less chances an individual
has to set higher aspirations and to see the pathways which lead to their fulllment. However, there
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is evidence that suggests information may not be a binding constraint. For instance, program
participants in both instances cited above had ample evidence to rule out the role of the second
explanation  informational constraints. Farmers in Busia, Kenya had ample opportunity to learn
both how to use the fertilizer, and to realize that the rates of return from its use were greater than
100%! In a somewhat di¤erent context, Jensen (2010) reports the results of a eld experiment in
the Dominican Republic, where students were informed about the actual return di¤erential between
primary and secondary/tertiary education, which they had previously underestimated. There was a
substantial increase in perceived returns to education but almost no discernible e¤ect on the actual
rates of completion of secondary schooling. Also, Cole et al (2009) show evidence on the e¤ects of
nancial literacy training (in Indonesia and India). They nd that it has a negligible impact on
actual likelihood to open a bank account.
These pieces of evidence suggest the possibility that a third (internal) channel may have a
role to play, perhaps arising as an adaptive response to external constraints but persisting even
after the latter are relaxed. The internal channel pins down the psychological consequences of
poverty and deprivation. Poverty sties aspirations not only due to opportunities and informational
disadvantages, but also because it a¤ects beliefs about own abilities to alter the condition of being
poor and hence their motivation for the same.
There is considerable evidence that conrms the existence of this third channel. One source of
evidence comes from the literature of "locus of control" which was already discussed above. Other
related evidence comes from the literature of cognitive dissonance in psychology, which argues that
people adapt beliefs and preferences to the external conditions in order to reduce dissonance between
the status they would like to achieve and what they actually can achieve.6 Moreover, those beliefs
and preferences are persistent. For example, a poor person for whom being a lawyer is not in her
possibility set, may believe that being a lawyer is something that she doesnt actually want. If
the external conditions happened to be relaxed, given her adapted preferences, it is plausible that
she may not aspire to be a lawyer anyway: i.e. aspiration failure. Finally, the internal channel
is also related to the behavioral bias call "learned helplessness" (Abramson et al, 1978). Learned
helplessness is the distortion of ones ability to change the environment after being exposed to
exogenous negative shocks.
Positive evidence for the importance of such psychological e¤ects comes from work by, for in-
stance, Jensen and Oster (2009). They report substantial changes in beliefs and attitudes on a
variety of gender-related issues as a result of exposure to Cable TV programs with inspiring female
6Oxoby (2004) explores status seeking when individuals experience dissonance and act (consciously or uncon-
sciously) to reduce it.
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protagonists. For instance, women in villages with cable TV reported lower tolerance to domestic
violence, weaker preference for sons as well as increases in autonomy and declines in fertility (see also
La Ferrara et al (2008) on fertility e¤ects). The authors also nd an increase in school enrollment
for girls, in villages where cable TV arrived earlier (and increased gender related programming).
3 A model of internal constraints
3.1 Set-up
The theory proposed in this paper is based on three key premises. These are:
(1) Aspirations are reference points which a¤ect individual utility from given outcomes
(2) An individuals actions themselves inuence his (future) aspirations, through the outcomes
realized.
(3) However, individuals may not fully internalize the feedback from their (current) actions to
(future) aspirations.
We now present a model based on these three key building blocks.
We consider a decision-maker (DM), characterized by a given initial endowment/social status
0.7 She must choose a costly action a that will determine the probability distribution over her nal
outcome  2 : We will assume that  is a closed bounded interval (so that  = ; ) and A
is a closed, bounded set (possibly nite),   <, A  < and that all payo¤ relevant functions are
continuous. The decision-maker has an aspiration (or goal) g 2  over the nal outcome she would
like to achieve. Given her aspiration g, the payo¤ she receives from an action a equals her expected
benet from this action, net of her cost of e¤ort as described by the utility function below:
u(a; g) =
Z
2
p(; a)b (; g) d   c (a)
In the expression above, p(; a) is the belief an individual has about the likelihood of achieving a nal
outcome  for an action/e¤ort level a, b(; g) is the benet she obtains from achieving a social status
, which could be a¤ected by her goal g and c (a) is the cost of action a. We now elaborate on the
individual arguments of the utility function above, in line with the key premises of our framework,
justifying our modeling choices along the way with well-documented evidence.
7For ease of exposition, we suppress initial status 0 in our notation for the variables and functions used in this
section, since all the analysis reported here is for a xed value of 0.
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Our rst key premise is that individual aspiration serves as a reference point for the benet the
individual derives from achieving a nal outcome. In our framework, this translates into the marginal
benet b (; g) from achieving a better outcome  being greater for a person with a higher aspiration
level g: other things being equal, a person with a higher aspiration level will have an incentive to
try harder to achieve a particular outcome. This premise is consistent with wide-ranging evidence
from psychology and economics. For instance, Heath et al (1999) present evidence from experiments
in psychology that subjects with high goals exert higher e¤ort and persist more in di¤erent physical
and cognitive tasks. They exercise at a higher rate, lift more weight, pedal more rapidly on a bicycle
and perform more rapidly on tasks like addition, subtraction or anagrams (Locke & Latham, 1990).
Recent experiments in economics (Abeler et al (2010)) also show that when participants have higher
reference points for earnings, they persevere longer at the experimental task. Inasmuch as aspirations
may be regarded as reference points for life goals, this evidence points to how higher goals can a¤ect
peoples life outcomes. Recent eld evidence is also consistent with this interpretation of aspirations
as reference points. On the positive side, a eld experiment with female entrepreneurs in India by
Field et al (2009) shows how higher aspirations can motivate changes in womens nancial behavior.
On the negative side, the Dunedin Longitudinal Study in New Zealand suggests that pessimistic
expectations signicantly increase the likelihood of low e¤ort even in non-market activities such as
personal health maintenance(more frequent smoking and less frequent exercise)(Clark et al, 2003).
Note that our assumption does not imply that individuals with high aspirations will necessarily
have higher utility because there is a cost to higher e¤ort as well. Indeed, the rst two studies cited
above nd that those with higher goals are not happier than those with lesser goals. The authors
point out that this apparent puzzle can be explained if goals are construed as reference points that
a¤ect realized utility (as outlined in the value function approach of Prospect Theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979)): achieving a given outcome  gives lower utility to a person if her aspiration
level is higher. Formally, this key assumption of complementarity between  and g can be stated
as follows:
Assumption 1. b(; g) is increasing in  and satises increasing di¤erences in  and g i.e. for
0   and g0  g,
b
 
0; g0
  b(; g0)  b  0; g  b (; g) :
When b (; g) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, @@ b(; g) > 0 and
@2
@@g b(; g) > 0.
To x ideas, the following example lists a few specic benet functions that satisfy assumption
1.
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Example 1 : (Specic benet functions that satisfy Assumption 1) Consider
b(; g) = () + v(; g)
where () is increasing in  so that the decision-maker gets a direct payo¤ gain when her nal
status is higher rather than lower and
v(; g) =

   g; if  < g
(   g); 0 <  < 1 if   g,
is a loss averse value function a la Kahneman and Tversky over nal social status where the reference
point is an aspiration level: the decision-makers frustration from falling short of her aspiration is
greater than her pleasure from exceeding her aspirations.
Another symmetric (and smooth) example of a benet function, one where gains and losses in
the nal social status relative to an aspiration level are treated in the same way, is
b(; g) = K   (   g)2 ; for large but nite K:
In this example, note that K has to be a large but nite number to ensure that b(; g) is increasing
in .
In both these examples, the incremental gain from enhanced social status is higher, the higher
the aspiration level. It is straightforward to check by computation that both the functional forms of
b (; g) discussed above satisfy assumption 18 . When assumption 1 is violated, the incremental gain
from enhanced social status could be decreasing in aspirations: for instance, when aspirations are
too high to begin with, actions may be decreasing in g when g is high enough.
A natural question that arises in any discussion of aspirations is one about their source: What
determines individual aspirations? Where do they come from? No doubt, there could be multiple
inuences on individual aspiration from the family, to the neighborhood, events in the wider world
or cultural norms. However, in order to clarify the mechanisms by which such factos impact on
individual aspirations, our starting point in this section is to model how constraints internal to an
individual can a¤ect outcomes, hence we focus on a specic, important channel: How a persons
(current) action choices themselves could inuence his (future) aspirations, through the outcomes
realized? This then, is our second central premise: that individual aspirations adapt to actions
chosen. Indeed, this premise is supported by work in both economics going as far back as Simon
8Note that, in both the above examples, b(; g) is decreasing in g for some values of . Strictly speaking, from
a formal viewpoint, we do not require this assumption. Assumption 1 would also be satised in an example where
b(; g) increasing in both  and g as in the case when
b(; g) =    0 j   gj
and both  > 0 > 0.
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(1955). More recently, Easterlin (2001) provides evidence from survey-based data that aspirations for
the future adapt to current income outcomes. Lant (1992) also empirically examines the adjustment
of aspiration levels in a behavioral simulation and shows that aspirations do adjust to performance.
Psychologists Brickman and Campbell (1971) apply the label "hedonic relativism" to the empirical
pattern that humans adapt to their current situation, becoming habituated to the good or the bad.
As we rise in accomplishments and possessions, our expectations also rise. This idea has also
been empirically validated by economists (eg. Stutzer (2004) amongst others). Most related to
our paper is the idea that aspirations adjust to what is seen as possiblediscussed by Jon Elster
(1983). Consistent with Elsters view, Barr and Clark (2009) nd that poors beliefs about the
amounts of income necessary to get by and live well increase with both their own household income
and the incomes of proximate others. They also nd a positive relationship between beliefs about
education necessary to get by and live well and own education. As noticed by Clark (2009), the
process of adjusting aspirations to what is seen as possiblecan occur in two di¤erent ways. The
rst involves adjusting aspirations downwards to reect disadvantaged circumstances. This is the
notion of adaptation invoked in the capability literature. The second type of adaptation involves
adjusting aspirations upwards to reect new opportunities and what "relevant" others have managed
to achieve. This notion of adaptation is closely related to recent empirical work on happiness in
economics and psychology.
Our formulation accommodates both types of aspirations adaptation. Specically, we model
aspirations, g, as the expected status given individuals actions:
g =
Z
2
p(; a)d = (a):
This formulation is consistent with ethnographer MacLeods (1995, p.15) view that "aspirations
reect individuals view of his or her own chances for getting ahead and are an internalization of
objective probabilities." It implies that agents have rational expectations in their choice of aspirations
and actions.
Our denition of aspirations has the desirable feature that, in the absence of uncertainty (i.e.,
when nal status is a deterministic function of actions), the aspiration level of the individual is
simply the nal status she will achieve given her actions. Of course, with uncertainty, captured by
the prior beliefs p(; a), the individual will only be able to aspire to the expected nal status of her
actions.
Having elaborated on the nature of the benet function b(; g), we now state the assumptions
on the other two elements in the utility function an individuals beliefs about the likelihood of
achieving a given outcome  for a given e¤ort level a, p(; a) and the cost of such e¤ort, c(a):
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Assumption 2: (i) p(; a0) rst order stochastically dominates p(; a) whenever a0  a; (ii)
c(a) is increasing in a.
Assumption 2(i), together with assumption 2(ii), states that the probability of achieving a higher
social status increases when the DM chooses a costlier action. We will return to a more detailed
analysis of individual beliefs in section 4 below.
Our formulation is similar to that in recent papers on reference-dependent preferences by Koszegi
and Rabin(200X, 200Y).
3.2 Internal constraints
We are now ready to formalize the idea of an "internally-constrained" DM with prior beliefs p(; a).
To set the stage for this, we rst distinguish between standard solution and the behavioral solution
to the individual decision problem of how e¤ort and aspiration choice. We begin with the standard
solution which serves as a normative benchmark for our analysis.
3.2.1 Standard decisions
Here, we consider a DM who recognizes and anticipates the fact that her (current) actions will
inuence her (future) aspirations, via the outcomes that they generate. In choosing her optimal
action, a standard DM therefore behaves as a farsighted individual who internalizes this feedback.
A standard decision corresponds to rational choice in our setting where the DM internalizes the fact
that her aspirations are a function of her chosen actions as they are nothing but the expected nal
status given her actions. The idea here is that the individual is farsighted. She anticipates that
her aspirations at are a¤ected by her actions, and taking this into account, she chooses her optimal
action. We do not claim that actual individuals behave like this. Rather, this provides us with a
normative benchmark against which the outcomes of a behavioral decision can be evaluated. We
formalize the concept of a standard solution in the following denition:
Denition 1. A standard solution is a pair (a^; g^) such that
a^ 2 argmax
a2A
m(a) =
Z
2
p(; a)b (; (a)) d   c (a)
and
g^ = (a^) =
Z
2
p(; a^)d
Let M denote the set of standard solutions. Note that m(a) is continuous in a and as A is
compact, M is non-empty. By denition, any two distinct standard solutions must yields the same
payo¤.
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3.2.2 Behavioral decisions and internal constraints
The solution concept we apply to this decision-making problem makes use of our third behavioral
premise that individuals do not fully anticipate the aspirations adaptation process corresponding
to boundedly rational choice. This premise implies that choices and preferences could diverge, hence
invalidating the principle of revealed preferences9 . In our framework, we model this by assuming
that the DM does not internalize the fact that her aspirations g adapt to her actions a. Rather, she
takes g as given while choosing her action a, failing to internalize the implications of this adaptive
process on her payo¤s fully.
There is considerable evidence of this kind of behavior in various kinds of life situationsbut
also specically with respect to aspirations. Easterlin (2001) provides evidence that people do not
anticipate the fact that their aspirations will adapt with income, hence overpredicting their future
happiness following an income increase. In a similar vein, Knight and Gunatilaka (2008) present
eld evidence of rural-urban migrant households settled in urban areas who dont foresee how their
aspirations will adapt to their new situation. Migrants are found to have a happiness score that is
lower than the mean score of both the rural sample, and the rest of the urban sample. The authors
show that the failure to anticipate that their aspirations will adapt when they move to the city is
what makes them choose suboptimally.
We label this situation described above as a Behavioral Decision. Note that we will require
that in any decision outcome, aspirations and actions are mutually consistent. An outcome of a
behavioral decision can be interpreted as the steady state of an adaptive mechanism in which the
aspiration level at adapts to actions achosen in the past but the individual myopically does not
internalize the adjustment of aspirations to chosen actions and instead takes aspirations as given.
In a behavioral decision, the DM chooses a, while taking g as given, to solve
Maxa2Au(a; g; 0) =
Z
2
p(; a)b (; g) d   c (a)
Let a(g) denote the set of payo¤ maximizing actions.
Denition 2: A Behavioral Solution is a pair (a; g) such that (i) a 2 a(g) and (ii) g = (a).
In a behavioral solution the individual takes her aspirations as given, although the chosen action
and the aspirations have to be mutually consistent via the feedback (:). Therefore, at a behavioral
9 In a related paper, "Behavioral Decisions and Welfare" (Dalton and Ghosal (2010)) formalize this point by
axiomatic characterization of standard and behavioral decisions using choice correspondences alone for a general class
of models which includes the specic framework and other related analysis (such as reference dependent preferences
(Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky-Kahneman (1991), Shalev (2000), Sugden and  (200X), Koscegi and Rabin
(200X, 200X) and projection bias (Lowenstein et. al. (200X)) as special cases. For a contrary normative position
that never contradicts observed choice see Bernheim and Rangel (200X) and Rubinstein and Salant (200X).
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solution, the individual does not internalize the feedback from actions to aspirations and imposes
an externality on herself. As a result, she may end up limiting her e¤orts and aspirations, hence
shortchanging herself on the life satisfcation she could attain. We refer to such an outcome as an
aspirations failure, i.e. an outcome where an individual e¤ort choice a yields an (expected) outcome
 and utility level lower than the maximum the individual can achieve.
Let B denote the set of behavioral solutions. The following useful result claries the structure
of the set of behavioral solutions and provides an explicit characterization of this set.
Proposition 1: Under assumptions 1 and 2, payo¤s satisfy the property of increasing di¤erences
in (a; g) and it follows that there exists a minimal and maximal element in a(g), a(g) and a(g), both
of which are increasing in g. Moreover, there exists a minimal and maximal elements in B,
 
a; g

and (a; g).
Proof. See appendix. 
Proposition 1 shows that when an individual ignores how her (future) aspirations may change
with her (current) actions, there are multiple levels of e¤ort and aspiration that are solutions to her
optimization problem. Across these behavioral solutions, higher aspiration levels would induce an
individual to optimally choose higher e¤ort levels. These features of the behavioral solution create
the possibility of an aspiration failure, i.e. that the individual may end up at an outcome lower than
the best she can achieve but it does not guarantee it.
To address this issue, we begin by providing a denition of what it means to be internally
constrained. Our normative benchmark is a standard solution. At a standard solution, the individual
is maximizing over consistent pairs of a; g, the payo¤ at each standard solution has to be (weakly)
greater the maximal payo¤ in a behavioral solution which corresponds to the payo¤ at the maximal
behavioral solution. The payo¤ to the individual at a standard solution sets a normative benchmark
against which the payo¤s of a behavioral decision can be compared. In other words, whenever
ignoring the feedback of (current) aspirations on (future) actions results in a disadvantageous e¤ort
and aspiration choice yielding less than the maximal payo¤, the individual is said to be internally
constrained. The sub-optimal outcome is regarded as an aspirations failure. Formally:
Denition 3. An individual is internally constrained at a behavioral solution (a; g) whenever
(a; g) =2M .
It is useful to link the behavior of the standard and behavioral decision makers to our discussion
on the locus of control, in section 2. At an intuitve level, the action choices of a standard decision
maker are consistent with the world view of an individual with a strong internal locus of control:
She fully internalizes the impact of her own actions on her life outcomes, hence she chooses actions
that maximizes her payo¤. In contrast, a behavioral decision makersaction choices are consistent
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with having a more external locus of control: She fails to appreciate how her actions feed into her
aspirations, hence she perceives external factors as having greater inuence over her life outcomes
than her own actions.10 .
When the intersection between the set of behavioral solutions and the set of standard solutions
(i.e. B \M) is empty, the individual is always internally constrained. In proposition 1, we saw that
that ignoring the feedback e¤ect from actions to aspirations in this way can lead to multiple equilibra
(a; g) in e¤ort and (expected) outcomes. However, we noted that despite the behavioral decision-
makers omissions, the standard (maximal) outcome could, in principle, still emerge as an outcome.
Lemma 1 below outlines the necessary and su¢ cient condition under which the behavioral decision
maker could still end up at the maximal outcome, like the standard decision-maker, i.e. (a; g) 2M .
Lemma 1 Consider condition (C): For (a; g), (a0; g0) such that g = (a) and g0 =  (a0), if
u(a; g)  u(a0; g), then u(a; g)  u(a0; g0). A behavioral solution (a; g) is also a standard solution
if and only if (C) holds.
Proof: See appendix. 
As seen from Lemma 1, the conditions under which the BDM would end up at her best possible
outcome (of the SDM) are quite stringent: If, and only if, there exists a unique (action, expected
outcome pair), (a, g) that payo¤ dominates every other action/expected outcome pair fa0; g0) of the
BDM, will her action lead to the maximal payo¤ outcome. If such an action choice does not exist
and hence (C) is violated, the individual is internally constrained at a behavioral solution (a; g).11
In general, (C) is not easily satised. If actions a are continuous, and the set of actions A is convex,
the standard solution must satisfy the rst order condition
0 = @am(a^)
(i.e. the marginal benet of additional e¤ort, taking into account that aspirations depend on action
via (:), should be zero) while a behavioral solution must satisfy the rst order condition:
0 = @au(a
; g), g =
Z
2
p(; a)d

:
10Note that our framework is consistent with a scenario where the decision-maker partially internalises the feedback
from actions to aspirations with probability . In such scenario, the individual in a behavioral decision chooses actions
to maximize ~u(a; g; 0) = u(a; g; 0) + (1  )v(a; 0).
11 In order to interpret just how restrictive condition (C) is it will be convenient to use rst-order conditions to
characterize both a behavioral solution and a standard solution. We will need to assume that the set of action choices
A is a continuous variable, contained in a convex and compact set. [SEE APPENDIX FOR FURTHER DETAILS:
However, in addition, there is a technical di¢ culty which we need to be careful about. Our formulation allows
for a value function a la Kahneman and Tversky and as 0 is a kink-point of the value function, the value function
isnt di¤erentiable in g. However, as we work with integrals, as long as the underlying gross payo¤s are continuous,
are continuously di¤erentiable almost everywhere and bounded, we can characterize decision-outcomes with take
derivatives].
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(i.e. the marginal benet of additional e¤ort, at the aspiration level consistent with chosen e¤ort
via (:), is equal to zero). These two conditions do not typically overlap.
Proposition 2. In a smooth setting the decision-maker is, typically, internally constrained.
Proof: See appendix. .
Proposition 2 makes the point that in a smooth setting, where some version of rst-order con-
ditions can be used to characterize solution to both behavioral and standard decision problems,
condition (C) is, typically, never satised and the Behavioral DM is internally constrained.
4 Initial Disadvantage and Aspirations Failure
So far, we have seen how ignoring the feedback from actions to aspirations can result in individual
aspirations failure. In this section, we examine the channels through which poverty (or more broadly,
initial disadvantage) increases the likelihood of such aspirations failure. Our interest in this link is
driven by two points in our study so far: (i) the choices of behavioral decision makers is consistent
with having a more external locus of control, as noted earlier, and (ii) having an external locus of
control is more common among the poor (as the descriptive evidence reviewed in section 2 suggests).
4.1 Initial status and behavioral solutions
Formally, we explore how poor initial condition/status (captured by the paramenter 0), could
a¤ect various components of individual utility. To this end, we introduce the initial social sta-
tus of the DM explicitly into the utility fuction introduced in section 3 so that now u(a; g; 0) =R
2 p(; a; 0)b (; g) d   c (a; 0) :
Note that in the above fomulation, 0 impacts on both beliefs and the cost of e¤ort. We turn to
each component, separately, below:
1. Beliefs: As MacLeod (1995) observes, in his ethnographic studies on aspirations in deprived
neighborhoods, success is rarer  unlike in the social world of middle-class children, "where the
connections between e¤ort and reward is taken for granted" (p.15). In other words, poor initial
conditions 0 is likely to give rise to much more pessimistic beliefs p(; a; 0) about the likelihood of
achieving a particular outcome through greater e¤ort. This is simply because those in a poor neigh-
borhood observe a biased selection of individual outcomes, i.e. of those who failed to achieve good
outcomes for their e¤ort. This lowers the expected benet of a certain action, and in expectation,
their aspirations as well. 12
12For the purposes of this section, we treat individual beliefs p(; a; 0) as exogenously dependent on his external
environment. In the next section, we endogenize these beliefs, i.e. we model how an individual rationally chooses his
relevant reference group (or cognitive window) , whose experience he draws upon to form his own beliefs.
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2. Costs: Earlier, we simply noted that the cost of higher e¤ort is greater. But there are several
plausible reasons why even the same amount of e¤ort may be more costly for the poor. This could
be through higher direct costs due to lack of information or access to networks (for e.g. about how to
apply for college scholarships), higher opportunity costs (for e.g., foregoing wage income to remain
in college) or even psychological costs (for e.g. it may be more intimidating for a poor person to
deal with a well-heeled bank o¢ cial).
Formally, our discussion above can be summarized with the following assumption:
Assumption 3:
(i) For a given  and action a, p(; a; 0) = p1(; a)p2(; 0) where both p1(:; a) and p2(:; 0)
are two probability distributions over  where p1(:; a) satises assumtion 1 and p2(:; 
0
0) rst order
stochastically dominates p2(:; 
0
0) whenever 
0
0  0;
(ii) c(a; 0) = C1(a)C2(0) where C1(:) satises assumption 1 and C2(:) is an increasing, contin-
uous functions of 013 .
The next proposition claries how the set of behavioral solutions behaves as initial status changes:
Lemma 2. Under assumptions 1,2 and either 3(i) or 3(ii), the minimal and maximal elements
in B (0),
 
a(0); g(0)

and (a(0); g(0)) ; are increasing in 0.
Proof: See appendix. .
Lemma 2 shows that the set of behavioral solutions is (weakly) increasing in the initial social
status of the individual, 0 so that both higher aspirations and higher actions (which, in turn, have
higher likelihood of changing status quo) are associated with higher initial status. This observation
is intuitive: If a person has more pessimistic beliefs about the e¤ects of his actions on outcomes,
then it is perfectly rational for him to pick aspirations and action choices that are lower. A similar
outcome will obtain if his cost of e¤ort are higher.
However, Lemma 2 doesnt tell us that a poorer individual is more likely to su¤er from an
aspirations failure (i.e. be internally constrained), with respect to his lower aspirations- or why.
This is the subject of the proposition below.
4.2 Initial status, aspirations failure and behavioral poevrty traps
To this end, we consider a setting where behavioral solutions may be payo¤ ranked so that the
maximal solution, namely the one with highest e¤ort and highest aspirations levels, dominates all
other solutions with respect to payo¤s. We will, now, develop an arguement- formally a selection
mechanism- that will pin down why the decision-maker with will converge to a payo¤ dominated
13Note that assumption 3(ii) doesnt require (nor does it rule out) that the "production function" of nal status is
non-convex in initial status. An example of a cost function that satises assumption 3(ii) is c(a; 0) = 0a.
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behavioral solution i.e be internally constrainted.
We consider the case where the individual has a nite number of available actions so that A =
fa1; :::; aNg with an < an+1, n = 0; 1; :::; N   1 and suppose  is a compact interval interval

; 

.
We assume that a1 results in the DM obtaining status quo with probability one i.e. p (0; a1) = 1
and p
 
0; a1

= 0 for all 0 6= 0. We assume that m(a; 0) is increasing in a so that (aK ; gK) is the
unique standard solution and that it is also a behavioral solution as is (a1; g1 = 0).
In order to develop a selection mechanism that will allow us derive why a DM will converge to
a payo¤ dominated behavioral solution, we will distinguish between a pre-decision aspiration level
g0 which is the aspiration level a behavioral DM takes as given when choosing an action and a
post-decision aspiration level g determined by the feedback e¤ect (:). Of course, a standard DM
will ignore the pre-decision aspiration level so that (aK ; gK) will continue to be the unique standard
solution. Further, we will asssume that the pre-decision aspiration level is determined stochastically
by some pdf f(g) (with associated cdf F (g)) over . Although, we would agree with the argument
that a DMs environment (family, neighborhood, friends, social networks) could a¤ect the pre-decision
aspiration level, we will assume that the stochastic process genertaing the pre-decision aspiration
level does not depend on initial status in order to tie our hands as we want to derive the link
between initial status and the likelihood of converging to a payo¤ dominated behavioral solution.
The selection mechanism involves two steps:
Step 1: An initial aspiration level g0 generated by some . Given g0, the individual chooses an
action a;
Step 2: Given a, the actual aspiration level is realized via the function (a).
Given such a selection mechanism, the following proposition characterizes the link between initial
status and the likelihood of convergeing to a payo¤ dominated behavioral solution:
Proposition 5: Under assumptions 1,2 and either 3(i) or 3(ii), the greater the disadvantage
(the lower the initial status) of the DM, (a) the greater is the likelihood that the DM converges to a
payo¤ dominated behavioral solution (the DM is internally constrained), and (b) lower the likelihood
that the DM chooses, and aspires, to perpetuate her initial status.
Proof: See appendix. .
The proposition relies on the result that for each initial status 0, there is a threshold value of
aspirations so that if the pre-decision level of aspirations falls below the threshold value, a behavioral
DM always converges to a payo¤ dominated solution. Moreover we show that the threshold value
is itself lower the higher the intial status of the DM is: this captures the point a poorer person has
to have a higher level of aspirations than a rich person in order not to be internally constrained.
As the stochastic process that generates the pre-decision aspiration level is independent of initial
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status, a poorer DM is more likely to be internally constrained than one with a higher initial status.
Importantly, Proposition 5 also suggests the possibility of a behavioral poverty trap i.e. a DM with
a lower initial status is more likely to choose, and aspire, to perpetuate her initial status.
5 Policy Analysis
We have characterized an internally constrained DM. We have showed how initial disadvantage make
more likely that an aspiration failure occurs and a behavioral poverty trap is perpetuated. We will
now examine interventions that aim to to break, or avoid, such a trap.
Social psychologists have already addressed this question. Becks cognitive therapy, for example,
aims at changing negative expectations and interpretations into more hopeful ones so that the DM
begins to believe that her responses produce desirable outcomes (Beck, 1970). What is central to
the path out of helplessness is the realization that ones behavior can e¤ect change (i.e. the e¤ect
of own e¤ort on own aspirations/achievements that makes a behavioral DM to become a standard
DM). Exposure to the fact that responding produces reinforcement is an e¤ective way of breaking up
learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975). It is critical to allow people to discover solutions for themselves
(Maier, 1961), which can be eased by observing successful similar others (e.g. role models) or by
being expericieng succesfully novel activities. The major principle for social psychologists seems to
be one of di¤erentiating events that can be controlled from those beyond control.
From a policy perspective, the relevant instruments should attempt to inuence (a) the process
by which the pre-decision aspirations levels of the DM are generated, F (:), (b) the initial status of
the DM, 0, and (c) the way the DM update her beliefs about the consequences of her actions, p(:).
However, in order to analyse the impact of such interventions, we will rst, in a special case of
the model studied in the preceeding section, analyse in one framework, both a behavioral poverty
traps and one which is driven by material deprivation alone. Then, using this model, we will study
the impact on individual behaviour of such policy interventions.
5.1 A simple of poverty traps
The DM chooses between just two actions, A = fa; ag where p (0; a) = 1 and p
 
0; a

= 0 for
all 0 6= 0 so that choosing action a results in the individual perpetuating her initial status while
p (0 +; a) = p, p (0; a) = 1   p and p
 
0; a

= 0 for all 0 =2 f0; 0 +g so that at a, the
individual attaches a probability p to improve her initial status by a discrete amount  while she
believes that she will remain at her initial social status with probability 1   p. Let g = (a) and
g = (a). To further simplify matters, assume that at Further, it will be convenient to normalize
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payo¤s so that b
 
0; g

= c (a; 0) = 0 (implying c (a; 0) > 0) and her payo¤ at
 
a; g (0)

is set
equal to zero. Finally, let ~g (0) solve the equationZ
2
p(; a)b (; g) d   c (a; 0) = 0:
There are three cases to consider:
CASE 1: g (0) < ~g (0) < g (0) so that both (a; g (0)) and
 
a; g (0)

are behavioral solutions.
In this case, we assume that (a; g (0)) is the unique standard solution.
CASE 2: ~g (0)  g (0) so that
 
a; g (0)

is both the unique behavioral solution and the unique
standard solution.
CASE 3: ~g (0)  g (0) so that (a; g (0)) is both the unique behavioral solution and the unique
standard solution.
Note that
 
a; g (0)

corresponds to an aspirations trap: as g (0) = 0 < ~g (0) she aspires to
remain at her initial social status and actually remains there. Further, (a; g (0)) corresponds to a
scenario with raised aspirations: g (0) = 0 + p > ~g (0) so that she aspires to improve her initial
status and believes she can do so with probability p.
Clearly ~g (0) is decreasing in 0 and as long as (:; 0) is non-creasing in 0, both g (0) and
g (0) are non-decreasing in 0 as well.
It follows that we can partition  into three regions as follows:
(i)  = f 2  : ~g ()  g ()g: if 0 2 ,
 
a; g (0)

is both the unique behavioral solution and
the unique standard solution (a poverty trap driven by material deprivation);
(ii) M =

 2  : g () < ~g () < g ()	: if 0 2 M both (a; g (0)) and  a; g (0) are be-
havioral solutions and the former is a standard solution (the possibility of a behavioral poverty
trap);
(iii)  =

 2  : g ()  ~g ()	: if 0 2  so that (a; g (0)) is both the unique behavioral
solution and the unique standard solution (no poverty trap).
It follows that a DM with very low initial status in  or a DM with a very high initial status in
 cannot be internally constrained. It is only a DM whose initial status is somewhere between the
two extremes in M who can be potentially internally constrained i.e. be caught in a behavioral
poverty trap where she chooses an action (and aspires to) perpetuating her status quo.
What is the likelihood that a DM with an initial status in M is internally constrained? As in
Proposition 5, let the pre-decision aspiration level g0 be generated by some pdf f(g) (with associated
cdf F (g)) over M . Then, (i) if g0 < ~g (0), the individual will choose a and will end up with an
aspiration level g i.e.
 
a; g (0)

is selected, and (ii) if g0  ~g (0), the individual will choose a and
end up with an aspiration level g i.e. (a; g (0)) is selected. It follows, from Proposition 5, that the
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probability that a DM with an initial status M is internally constrained is close to one if her initial
status is just above the boundary of  after which it monotonically declines to zero for a DM with
an intial status close to the boundary of .
We summarize the analysis as the following proposition:
Proposition 6: (i) The probability that the DM chooses an action, and aspires to, perpetuate
her initial staus is monotonically decreasing in 0; (ii) Only a DM with an initial status in M
has the potential to be stuch in a behavioral poverty trap and the likelihood of such an occurence
is declining in the initial status of the DM: a DM whose initial status is in either  (poverty trap
driven by material deprivation) or  (no poverty trap) isnt internally constrained.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate14 this result:
Q0
1
Q MQ Q
Pr( . )asp trap
Figure 3: Probability of an "aspirations trap"
Q0
1
Q MQ Q
Pr(int. .)constr
Figure 4: Probability that the DM is internally constrained
In what follows, starting from a situation where the DM is located at
 
a; g (0)

, we examine the
e¢ cacy of di¤erent policy interventions.
14 In both the gures, it is assumed that f(:) is uniform
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5.2 Changing the initial status (0) or the distribution of pre-decision
(F (:))
Changes in F (:) correspond to changes in the process by which the pre-decision aspirations levels are
generated. This process can be a¤ected in at least two di¤erent ways. One way is by a¤ecting parents
expectations and aspirations for their children, which have been shown as important predictors of
educational attainment. There is evidence that parental interest in a childs education has four
times more inuence on attainment by age 16 than does socioeconomic background (Leitch, 2006).
Parenting programs which help families improve child behaviour and achievement are examples of
policy interventions aiming at inuencing F ().15
An alternative way to a¤ect F () is by designing policy interventions which help the poor children
to discover that the realization of their behavior can a¤ect positive changes. One such programme
is the Venezuelan Classical Music Orchestras for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. More
than 400,000 Venezuelan children, most coming from poor families have taken and take part of a
network of orchestras directed by Jose Antonio Abreu that began being carried out 30 years ago.
The lessons are free of charge and a public foundation "FESNOJIV" provides the instruments. The
project does not primarily aim to create professional musicians, but to integrate poor children into
the society. 96 percent of the young musicians have good to excellent school records. They stand out
as high achievers thanks to their steady relationship with music. UNESCO awarded FESNOJIV its
International Music Award in 1993-94 and in 1998 UNDP commended it as an outstanding example
of poverty reduction. In the words of its founder, Antonio Abreu16 : "The majority of the children
and juveniles belong to the groups that are most vulnerable and excluded in all of Venezuelan society.
Participating in the orchestral movement has made it possible for them to set up new goals, plans,
projects and dreams, and at the same time it is a way of creating meaning and helping them in
their day-to-day struggle for better conditions of life through the variety of opportunities that the
orchestral movement o¤ers them."
The formal analysis suggests that direct attempts to change the extrinsic circumstances (by, for
example, enhancing the economic status via transfers of wealth) will be welfare enhancing for very
poor individuals.
In the model presented above, such individuals will have an initial status 0 2 . We interpret
such individuals as being in a situation characterized by a conventional poverty trap driven by
external circumstances as for such individuals a change in their material circumstances has to precede
15See for example "Supporting parents on kids education (SPOKE)" program in UK, which work with parents to
set personal goals for their children (Silva et al 2008)
16See http://www.rightlivelihood.org/recip/abreu.htm
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any other sort of intervention. However, an intervention that alters the material circumstances so
that initial status is just tipped into M may not alter the choices of the DM she likely to be
internally constrained, and theefore caught in a behavioral poverty trap, with very high probability.
In such a scenario, a DM will benet from policy interventions that directly impact on the process
by which pre-decision aspirations are generated.
It follows that interventions that solely focus on altering the material circumstances of individuals
may be less e¤ective than those that are complemented by programs that directly impact on the
process by which pre-decision aspirations are generated. Even when the former class of policies
succeed in lifting individuals out of material deprivation, such individuals could still be caught in
an "aspirations trap" from which they might escape only with the help of complementary policies
that raise aspirations.
Our analysis also identies conditions under which altering internal constraints on their own
would enable poor people to "contest and alter the conditions of their own poverty." Such a siltuation
would obtain when the initial status of the DM is in M : in such a case, an intervention that
successfully raises the pre-decision aspirations of the DM would alter the choices the DM makes and
therefore alter her initial status.
We refer the reader to the extensive discussion in section 2 above for evidence on how interven-
tions solely focused on improving material circumstances might not break "aspirations traps" but
interventions that seek to improve both material circumstances and the process generating initial
aspirations might.
5.3 Role models and cognitive neighborhoods (p)
Another way to raise the aspirations of individuals belonging to a disadvantaged group would be to
alter the behavior of a carefully chosen subset of such individuals (e.g. role models).
Individuals draw on the aspirations of their cognitive neighbors and, in this sense, role models
may become an important variable in the formation of their aspirations (Rao and Walton, 2004).
Moreover, role models also enable a poor DM to "contest, and alter, the conditions of her own
poverty". But what determines which other individuals are cognitive neighbors and, thus, potential
role models of the DM? We address this question below.
Consider an internally constrained individual located in an aspirations trap. The role model
comes into the picture as an external signal. Suppose the individual observes an external signal
which consists in the following information about a di¤erent individual: the initial status, 00, action
a and a nal status 00 +. We say that this individual becomes a role model when the internally
constrained individual located in an aspirations trap chooses the action a after observing the signal,
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i.e. the individual becomes inspirational. When does it happen? Will any external signal convinces
a "fatalistic" individual to choose an action that shifts her to a better equilibrium? If not, what are
the conditions under which this happens?
Social psychologists have studied these concerns for decades, and have consistently highlighted
the similarity of others as an important aspect for the transmission of aspirations (e.g. Lockwood
and Kunda, 1997). There are countless programs showcasing the successes of a superior individual
that are designed to boost the aspirations of a particular target group with similar initial conditions.
For example, prominent women scientists are often invited to address high school girls or eminent
African Americans are introduced to African American children. Moreover, not only similarity
has been shown to be an important aspect for the transmission of aspirations, but also research
have conrmed that social comparison is an endogenous process (e.g., Festinger, 1954, Goethals
& Darley, 1977; Wood, 1989). That is, people choose to compare only with similar others and
avoid comparisons with dissimilar others. For example, Ho¤ner C. and M. Buchanan (2005) study
the factors that make television characters appealing as role models to young adults. Respondents
identied more strongly with characters whom they regarded as similar to themselves. Specically,
respondents reported higher levels of wishful identication with characters of the same gender, and
with characters whom they perceived as sharing their own attitudes.
In order to model the conditions under which an external signal serves as a role model, following
Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001), we endow the individual with a similarity function s : ! [0; 1]
where s
 
0; 
0
0

= 0 denotes no similarity and s
 
0; 
0
0

= 1 denotes full similarity. This function
provides a quantication of the DMs similarity assessment of how similar her own initial status is
relative to the initial status of the potential role model. We assume that assessing the similarity
across di¤erent pairs of initial status is the main cognitive task of the DM. Importantly, the similarity
function is subjective in the same sense in which probabilities are subjective in expected utility
theory. Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) provide an axiomatic treatment of choice determined by
25
similarity weighted payo¤ estimation.17 A continuous similarity function that is consistent with
Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) is:
s
 
00; 0

= 1 
00   0   
Consistent with the above similarity function, we assume that s (0; 0) = 1 and that s
 
00; 0

is decreasing in the distance between 00 and 0.
Fix the external signal
 
00; a; 
0
1 = + 
0
0

. Given a similarity function, the DM updates her
payo¤s from choosing a as follows:
s
 
00; 0
 
b
 
+ 0; g (0)
  c (a; 0)+ pb  + 0; g (0)  c (a; 0)
=
 
s
 
00; 0

+ p

b
 
+ 0; g (0)
   1 + s  00; 0 c (a; 0)
which, after an a¢ ne transformation of payo¤s, is equivalent to
s
 
00; 0

+ p
1 + s
 
00; 0
b  + 0; g (0)  c (a; 0)
This has the interpretation that after observing the external signal, the DM has updated her prior
beliefs so that her posterior beliefs of changing her social status is:
p1 =
s
 
00; 0

+ p
1 + s
 
00; 0

and with probability 1   p1 she believes that she will remain at her initial social status. As p1 is
increasing in s
 
00; 0

so that p1  p0 with the strict inequality whenever s
 
00; 0

> 0. Therefore,
the updating of priors after observing the external signal is an example of similarity based learning.
After observing the external signal, the DM will choose a i¤
s
 
00; 0

+ p
1 + s
 
00; 0
b  + 0; g (0)  c (a; 0)  0
17We note that there may be an objective element in the assessment of similarity. The problem is familiar from
econometrics where one might want to infer the conditional distribution p (y 2 Ajx0) where the sample frequency of x0
is zero i.e. p(x0) = 0. Assume that all variables are unidimensional. In such scenarios, it is standard in econometrics
to use a uniform kernel estimate (Hardle, 1990; Manski, 1995) which is an estimate of the sample frequency with
which y 2 A amongst those observations xi such that jxi   x0j < d (where d is the sample specic bandwidth chosen
to conne attention to those observations in which xi is close to x0). In a sample with n observations, the expression
for the uniform kernel estimate is PN
i=1 1 (y 2 A)1 (jxi   x0j < d)PN
i=1 1 (jxi   x0j < d)
:
Then, the uniform kernel estimate corresponds to a "bandwidth" similarity function where
s
 
00; 0

=
n1, if j00   0j  d
0, otherwise
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or equivalently
s
 
00; 0

+ p
1 + s
 
00; 0
  p^ (0) = c (a; 0)
b
 
+ 0; g (0)

Observe that as s
 
00; 0
! 0, p1 ! p. Moreover, if s  00; 0 = 1, p1 = 1+p2 . Therefore, even when
s
 
00; 0

= 1, the external signal serves as a role model i¤ 1+p2  p^ (0). Specically, whenever
p^ (0) >
1+p
2 , the individual located at 0 will never learn from observing an external signal. More
interesting note that if lims(00;0)!0
s(00;0)+p
1+s(00;0)
= p < p^ (0). It follows that as long as s
 
00; 0

is
(weakly) decreasing in the distance between 00 and 0 there is an endogenous upper bound to the
cognitive window of the individual which can be computed from the inequality
s
 
00; 0
  p^ (0)  p
1  p^ (0) :
The fraction on the right hand side of the preceding inequality is increasing in p^ (0) and decreasing
in p. As p^ (0) =
c(a;0)
b(+0;g(0))
, it follows that the size of the cognitive window of the individual
located at 0 is decreasing when (i) the cost of choosing the action a is higher; (ii) the benet of
achieving a higher nal status is low when the individual has low pre-decision aspirations to begin
with; (iii) the prior beliefs of the individual are more pessimistic.
Note that for the individual who consists of the external signal to choose a; it must be the
case that she attaches a su¢ ciently high probability to alter her initial status in the rst place i.e.
p0  p^  00 where p0 is the initial belief of the individual in question. It follows that the ideal role
model is one with a similar initial status to the DM but a much higher self-condence than the DM
locked in an aspirations trap.
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion:
Proposition 7. Suppose p0  p^  00 but p < p^ (0). The external signal will be a role model if
and only if p < p^ (0)  s(
0
0;0)+p
1+s(00;0)
. If s
 
00; 0

is (weakly) decreasing in the distance between 00
and 0, the size of the cognitive window of the individual located at 0 is implicitly dened by the
inequality s
 
00; 0
  p^(0) p1 p^(0) and is decreasing in c (a; 0) and increasing in b  + 0; g (0) and
p.
The above proposition explains how the DM chooses her "cognitive window", the sample of indi-
viduals from which the DM draws her role models. Ideally, what a DM wants to observe is someone
who is identical (similarity one) to herself but with a higher level of aspirations and achievement.
However, a person similar to herself is likely to have the same aspirations, and make the same de-
cisions as herself. So the DM needs to include individuals with a higher initial status than herself
in her cognitive window and/or similar initial status but di¤erent beliefs i.e. have a much higher
degree of self-condence
Proposition 7 implies that a DM with a low initial status will exclude those with a higher
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initial status from her cognitive window when the similarity assessment is decreasing in the distance
between initial status. If the DMs includes only those individuals who are similar to her in her
cognitive window, she is likely to observe other individuals who have similar aspirations and make
similar decisions to herself. In order to increase the likelihood of observing an individual who has a
higher degree of self-condence and therefore, has higher aspirations and achievement she will need
to include individuals who arent similar (i.e. have a higher initial social status) to herself. However,
Proposition 7 implies that there is limit on how far the individual will go so that, typically, there
will be individuals who will be excluded from her cognitive window. Thus, the DM will not attach
much weight on the experience of success of an individual who is characterized by very di¤erent
circumstances such as culture or wealth or any other relevant dimension viewed as relevant by the
decision maker as determining initial status.
The evidence presented in La Ferrara et al (2009) emphasizes both the potential and the limi-
tations of other successful persons in serving as role models. On the one hand, the authors provide
persuasive evidence that strong female protagonists and characters in various soap operas shown
in Brazil resulted in higher aspirations and lower fertility outcomes in the country between the
early 1970s to the 1990s. However, unlike the e¤ects of programs made by Rede Globo, a rival
company Sistema Brasileiro de Televisao (SBT)s programs had little impact on fertility outcomes.
The authors found that SBT broadcasts programs were imported from Mexico and the US, and were
generally not perceived as realistic portraits of Brazilian society. Brazilian women strongly identied
with the female characters in Rede Globos soaps (making it common for their girl children to be
given the names of lead characters) but the lack of similaritywith American or Mexican women
resulted in their negligible impact of the latter set of serials.
Changing a role model to break an aspiration trap has been empirically showed to be a very
e¤ective policy of poverty reduction. One of the most remarkable examples comes from Kolkata
(Calcutta), India. The objective of the Government by the 1990s was to decrease the HIV infections
in Sonagachi, Kolkatas oldest and best established red-light district, with over 4,000 sex workers
working in 370 brothels that service about 20,000 clients a day (see Rao and Walton, 2004, p.7). As
Rao and Walton (op. cit.) points out, during the 1990s, the Governments "interventions tended to
reect the values of the middle-class bureaucrats who crafted them. They focused on rehabilitating
the sex workers, rescuing them, and [...] training them." to be ready for an insertion in the "good
life". This strategy did not work. As Rao and Walton argues, the relatively high earnings in sex
work and the discrimination faced by former sex workers in the world outside Sonagachi, led most
women to return prostitution.
In this context, a very di¤erent strategy worked out. A strategy that involved convincing and
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training twelve sex workers which would pass the important information about the use of condoms
as peers education to their co-workers. This process, as argued by Rao and Walton, led over a period
of two or three years, to a "metamorphosis" in the sex workers aspirations. Moreover, the program
was remarkably successful as a health intervention, with almost all sex workers using condoms at
least some of the time and the HIV incidence in Sonagachi substantially decreased.
This successful health intervention can be interpreted with the lens of our model as a change in
the quality of the cognitive window of a DM.
There is plenty of evidence that role models can inspire individuals to become actively involved
in activities that they wouldnt have chosen otherwise. Notwithstanding the fact that role models
can create behavioral changes in people from any socioeconomic condition, the distribution of role
models across the income spectrum is uneven, which makes the introduction of role models more
stringent for poor than for rich people.
In a randomized transfer program in Nicaragua, Macours and Vakis (2009) show that communi-
cation with motivated and successful nearby leaders can lead to higher aspirations and corresponding
investment behavior. Nguyen (2008) provides evidence from a eld experiment in Madagascar that
observing a role model of poor background has a larger impact on poor childrens test scores than
observing someone of rich background. Buunk et al (2007) show that a positive role model stimulates
career-oriented behavior. They examined the e¤ects of social comparison among students in their
nal year of study. Participants were presented with a ctitious interview with a new graduate who
was either successful or unsuccessful in the job market. Exposure to the successful target led to a
higher degree of inspiration, identication, and proactive career behavior than did exposure to the
unsuccessful target.
Recent laboratory work has shown that role models may be capable of bu¤ering stereotyped
individuals from the adverse e¤ects of stereotype threat when the role modelscounter-stereotypic
behavior is observed. For example, Marx and Go¤ (2005) show that when a black experimenter gave
a verbal test to black participants, they did not su¤er the typical performance decrements associated
with stereotype threat.
Finally, there is also empirical evidence of the inspirational role of President Barack Obama for
Black-Americans. Using a random sample, Marx et al (2009) show that Obamas speech before the
presidential election had a profound benecial e¤ect on Black-Americansexam performance.
5.4 Social connectedness and the transmission of aspirations
The upshot of the above analysis is that an individual included in the cognitive window of the
DM (i.e. has the status of a role model) generates an information externality as, with positive
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probability, the DM will change her aspirations and her choices upon observing the achievement of
such an individual. This suggests that there is the possibility that aspirations could be transmitted
across individuals in a society. We conclude this section with a simple N -person extension of the
preceding model where the transmission of aspirations is linked to the distribution of initial social
status (i.e. the nature of inequality) in a society.
To this end, consider a society with N (a large but nite number) individuals distributed on
; 

. We say that i is connected to j if i0 < 
j
0 but when j chooses a j belongs to the cognitive
neighborhood chosen by i and is a role model for i. A society is strongly connected if between any
two individuals i; j in a society there is a chain of individuals k1; :::; kM such that i is connected
to k1, km is connected to km+1, m = 1; :::;M   1, and kM is connected to j. In other words, in a
connected society, any two individuals are linked by a chain of overlapping cognitive windows.
Dene the similarity function so that s
 
00; 0

= 1  j
0
0 0j
j j . Then, Proposition 7 implies that
p^ (0)  s(
0
0;0)+p
1+s(00;0)
if and only if
00   0       1+p 2p^(0)2p^(0)  = ":
One nal denition: the distribution of individuals in a society is globally dense if for each
individual player i there exists a di¤erent individual j with
i0   j0 <      1+p 2p^(0)2p^(0) . When
the distribution of initial status is globally dense, then any two individuals in a society are linked
via a chain of overlapping cognitive windows. In this sense, when the distribution of initial status
is globally dense, a poor individual is linked to rich individual in a sequence of small steps. Note
that when the distribution of initial status is polarized so that groups of DMs are clustered at very
di¤erent points in terms of initial status, the distribution of initial status will fail to be globally
dense (example 3 below).
One nal piece of notation: let G(:) denote the cumulative distribution function that generates
the initial beliefs p of each individual in the society.
In this society, each individual is solving a decision-problem where the choice is between choosing
an action that perpetuates her initial status or an action that changes her initial status with positive
probability. Individuals choose in sequnece with an inidividual with highest initial status choosing
rst, followed by the second highest initial status and so on. If a subset of individuals have the
same initial status, then the order with which each inidvidual move is determined randomly. We
assume that the pre-decision aspiration level of a DM is to perpetuate her initial status, although the
individual could observe the actions and achievement of other individual included in her cognitive
window before choosing her action.
Proposition 8. If the distribution of individuals is globally dense the society is strongly con-
nected. As long as there exists one individual k with pk  p^

k0

, all individuals in it choose
a and aspire to change their social status. The probability that all individuals will choose a is
30
maxk2N 1 G(p^

k0

).
Proof. See appendix. 
Thus, when the distribution of initial status is globally dense, the society is strongly connected.
In a connected society, whether or not any one DM is internally constrained depends on what other
individuals included in her cognitive neighborhood do: each such individual imposes an information
externality on the individual that determines whether or not she is internally constrained. Therefore,
as long as one individual is able to relax her internal constraint, all individuals in the society are
also able to relax their internal constraints.
The following example examines what happens when the distribution of individuals fails to be
globally dense.
Example 2. (Polarization and aspirations failure)
Consider a society where a fraction  individuals are initially located at  and 1   individuals
are initially located at  with s
 
; 

= 0. Assume that p < p^ (0) for all 0 =  while p0  p^
 
00

for all 00 = . Observe that no 
0
0 =  is in the cognitive neighborhood of any 0 = . Therefore, all
individuals initially located at  are internally constrained.
The next example examines what happens in an egalitarian but poor society where the distrib-
ution of individuals is concentrated at a specic disadvantageous initial status.
Example 3. (Equality and aspirations failure)
Consider a society where all individuals are initially located at . Assume that p^ () > 1. Then,
clearly p < p^ (0) for all 0 =  and there is aspirations failure for all individuals initially located at
. More generally, the probability that all individuals choose a = a is 1  [G(p^ (0))]N . 
Proposition 8, together with the examples 2 and 3, suggests that inequality in the distribution
of initial status may have subtle e¤ect on the how individuals in a society aspire and choose actions.
On the one hand, when the distribution of initial status is polarized, the society may fail to be
connected and therefore, there will be failure in the transmission of aspirations across individuals in
that society and individuals with a low initial social status will be internally constrained and caught
in an aspirations trap. On the other hand, when there is perfect equality in the distribution of initial
status, either all individuals in a society have high aspirations and seek to change their status quo or
all individuals in a society are caught in an aspirations trap. The latter is the more likely scenario
if the group of individuals is poor to begin with so that individuals within the group reinforce each
others choices and aspirations.
The work of sociologist W. J. Wilson provides a clear evidence of the link "social exclusion-lack
of aspirations-poverty" that was observed in U.S. urban ghettos since 1970. Wilson (1987) makes
the case that the increasing "social isolation" of the poor, especially the black poor, has greatly
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contributed to their poverty. "Out of sight, out of mind" allowed most of the non-poor to either
deny or forget the conditions in the ghetto. Moreover, Wilson argues that poverty implies exclusion.
He claims that concentration of poverty results in the isolation of the poor from the middle class
and its corresponding role models, resources, and job networks. More generally, he argues that
being poor in a mixed-income neighborhood is less damaging than being poor in a high poverty
neighborhood. Likewise, they are consistent with empirical evidence showing that communities with
higher levels of social cohesion and narrow gaps between poor and rich produce better health and
welfare outcomes than wealthier societies with higher levels of social disintegration (Putnam, 2000).
Marmot and Wilkinson (1999) show that in addition to economic prosperity, equality and social
cohesion are also powerful determinants of health. The experience of Kerala is also a very clear
evidence that social cohesion through participation of the poor in programs contributes to achieve
high positive indices of Human Development (see for example, Kannan, 2000).
6 Related Literature
The idea that choices are determined by aspirations is not new in the economics literature and goes
back to the seminal work of Simon (1955) and more recently, Selten (1998). This paper contributes
to this literature by o¤ering a formal equilibrium analysis to model this idea.
Moreover, much of standard economic analysis makes a sharp distinction between preference pa-
rameters (aspirations) and external circumstances (initial status or endowments) and assumes that
these are both exogenous to the individual. In order to account for a systematic link between initial
disadvantage and aspirations and beliefs, one could assume that external circumstances directly
operate via a psychological channel and show how such a direct link could perpetuate poverty traps.
In fact two recent papers, Genicot and Ray (2009) (via the assumption of an exogenous aspirations
neighborhood) and Bannerjee and Mullainathan (2010) (via the assumption that the proportion
of extra income spent on temptation goods is decreasing with overall income) take precisely this
approach. In contrast to these two works, our paper derives the link between initial disadvantage
with aspirations failure and disadvantageous choices18 . Note that if we had assumed that external
circumstances directly operate via a psychological channel in perpetuating poverty traps, we would
have to conclude that only changing extrinsic circumstances (i.e. enhancing income, changing neigh-
borhoods or occupation) could alter poverty traps. In contrast, our analysis suggests that one way
out of poverty traps is to directly shock the aspirations of individuals thus relaxing their internal
18Our model can be viewed as a contribution to ll the gap in the literature pointed out by Esther Duo (2003,
p10): . . . what is needed is a theory of how poverty inuences decision-making, not only by a¤ecting the constraints,
but by changing the decision-making process itself.
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constraints, a view consistent with interventions designed to alter goal-setting behavior or the use
dream building sessions in specic programs aimed at disadvantaged groups19 .
Ray (2003) (commenting on Appadurai (2004)) and Genicot and Ray (2009), argue that poverty
and failure of aspirations may be reciprocally linked within a self-sustaining trap. By studying a
model in which individuals choose a level of e¤ort to minimize their aspirations gap, Ray (2003) and
Genicot and Ray (2009) show that individual investment e¤orts should be minimal for both high and
low aspiration gaps. In both these papers, the aspirations neighborhood of an individual is taken
as exogenous and as aspirations are formed as a function of an individuals exogenous aspirations
neighborhood, Genicot and Ray (2009) assume that aspirations is the psychological channel by which
extrinsic circumstances a¤ect individual choices and play a role in perpetuating poverty traps.
Bannerjee and Mullainathan (2010) also examine poverty traps in model where poorer individuals
allocate a higher proportion of their income to temptation goods relative to individuals with a higher
income. A key assumption in their analysis relates to the shape of temptation viewed as a function
of overall consumption so that temptation is assumed to be the psychological channel by which
extrinsic circumstances a¤ect individual choice and thus perpetuate poverty traps.
Our paper is also related to the literature on endogenous reference points (Shalev (2000), Koszegi
(2005), Koszegi and Rabin (2006) and (2007), Heifetz and Minelli (2006), Dalton and Ghosal (2010)).
We add to this literature by specifying a selection mechanism to account for why individuals would
converge to a payo¤ dominated decision outcome and also the di¤erent ways in which reference may
be manipulated (eg role models).
Our paper contributes to the literature of role models by introducing the notion of similarity
based learning. The paper in this literature which is most related to ours is Manski (1993), which
also introduces a notion of closeness in terms of past history between the role model and the person
who learns. Manski focus in on the conditions under which the expected utility of an action can be
estimated nonparametrically after observing a "role model". Our focus, however, is on the
Another related paper is Chung (2000), which introduces a simple model of role models where
individuals are rational Bayesian learners. In contrast to what we do in this paper Chun assumes
that individuals attach a similarity weight of one to the achievement of other individuals.
Our paper is also related to the literature of relative deprivation because the concept of poverty
we use is a relative one.20 It is also related to the literature of empowerment, since it provides an
19A specic intervention discused in greater detail in section 6 below where dream building as a key ingredient in
empowering disadvantaged groupd is the Songachi Project, an initiative aimed at sex workers collective in Kolkata,
India.
20See Stark and Taylor (1991) for a general introduction to relative deprivation, Deaton (2001) for an application
to health, Stark (2006) for an application to growth. For empirical papers on relative deprivation, see Duclos and
Philippe (2002), Satya (1991), Berrebi and Silber (1985) among others.
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analytical framework to support the theoretical ideas of empowerment.21 As in the literature of
neighborhood e¤ects (Durlauf, 2003), we also obtain the result that persistence in economic status
could be generated by group-level inuences on individuals, although unlike that literature, we focus
on aspirations as the transmission mechanism.
That aspirations adapt to chosen actions also appears in a strategic context in the literature
of reinforcement learning in games where agents adapt by comparing payo¤s achieved from actions
chosen in the past relative to an aspiration level. (See for instance Bendor, Mookherjee and Ray,
2001 or Karandikar et al, 1998).
Finally, our paper is related to some specic particular models that take identity issues into
consideration to study poverty and social exclusion, such us Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Ho¤ and
Pandey (2004) or Ho¤ and Sen (2005).
7 Final Remarks
We propose a model that associates initial disadvantage, aspirations and choices to alter initial
status. Our analysis suggests internal constraints are a key ingredient in perpetuating poverty
traps. We nd that initial disadvantage is likely to generate aspirations failures, a combination of
aspirations and choices that perpetuate initial status. We then study how and under what conditions
a role model can help a poor person to solve her aspirations failure and climb out of poverty. We
allow the person to choose her cognitive window and show that, in principle, a poor person will
restrict the set from where the role model is selected. Our model and results are supported by
evidence from anthropology, sociology and social psychology. The fact that the same condition of
poverty a¤ects (and is a¤ected by) lack of aspirations and hope is a recurrent topic in any of these
disciplines, although surprisingly, it has been disregarded in formal economic models. The concept
of empowerment has also been understudied in economics theory, despite the great importance that
is given to the concept in the anti-poverty policy agenda.
The model could be extended in a variety of ways. Possibilities include: extending it to a n-player
strategic context; studying the dynamics of di¤erent initial income distributions, analyzing the e¤ect
of di¤erent types of policies (other than a role model) on solving an aspirations failure; accounting
for overlapping generations; considering role models who are not always positive and studying the
interaction of di¤erent types of aspirations such us material, religious, etc.
21See for instance Stern (2004), World Bank (2002), or Alsop and Heinsohn (2005)
34
References
[1] Abeler J, A. Falk, L. Goette and D. Hu¤man (2010) "Reference Points and E¤ort Provision,"
forthcoming, American Economic Review.
[2] Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P., and Teasdale, J. D. (1978). "Learned helplessness in
humans: Critique and reformulation" Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 32-48.
[3] Akerlof G. and R. Kranton (2000) "Economics and Identity," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
115, 3, 715-753.
[4] Alsop R. and N. Heinsohn (2005) Measuring Empowerment in Practice: Structuring Analysis
and Framing Indicators,World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3510.
[5] Appadurai (2004) The Capacity to aspire, in V. Rao and M. Walton (eds.), Culture and
Public Action, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank,
Washington, DC.
[6] Atkinson, A.B. (1998) Social Exclusion, Poverty and Unemployment, in Exclusion, Em-
ployment and Opportunity, A. B. Atkinson and J. Hills (Eds.) Centre for Analysis of Social
Exclusion, January.
[7] Atkinson, A.B. (2003) Income Inequality in OECD Countries: Data and Explanations,
CESifo Economic Studies, 49, 479-513
[8] Azariadis C. and J. Stachurski (2004) Poverty Traps,Forthcoming in the Handbook of Eco-
nomic Growth, Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf, eds.
[9] Azariadis, C. (2004): The theory of poverty traps: what have we learned?in Poverty Traps,
S. Bowles, S. Durlauf and K. Ho, eds.
[10] Banerjee A. V. and A.F. Newman (1991) Risk-Bearing and the Theory of Income Distribu-
tion,Review of Economic Studies, 58, 211-235
[11] Banerjee A. V. and A.F. Newman (1993) Occupational Choice and the Process of Develop-
ment,Journal of Political Economy, 101, 2, 274-298
[12] Banerjee A. V. and S. Mullainathan (2010) "The shape of temptation: implicatinos for the
economic lives of the poor," NBER Working Paper, No. 15973.
[13] Bardhan P (1997) Corruption and Development: A Review of the issues, Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 35, 1320-1346
35
[14] Barr A. and D. Clark (2009) "Do the Poor Adapt to Low Income, Minimal Education and
Ill-health?," Journal of African Economies, 19, 3, 257293
[15] Beck A.T. (1970) "Cognitive therapy: nature and relation to behavioral therapy," Behavior
Therapy, 1, 2, 184-200
[16] Bendor, J., D. Mookherjee, and D. Ray. (2001) Aspiration-Based Reinforcement Learning in
Repeated Games: An Overview,International Game Theory Review, 3(2-3): 159-174.
[17] Biewen M. (2003) Who Are the Chronic Poor? Evidence on the Extent and the Composition
of Chronic Poverty in Germany,IZA DP No. 779
[18] Bloom, D. E., D. Canning and J. Sevilla (2003) Geography and Poverty Traps,Journal of
Economic Growth, 8, 355-378.
[19] Brickman, P. and Campbell, D.T. (1971) "Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good So-
ciety", in M.H. Apley (ed.) Adaptation-Level Theory: A Symposium, New York: Academic
Press, 287-302.
[20] Buunk A P (2007), "A positive role model may stimulate career-oriented behavior," Journal
of Applied Social Psychology, 37, 7, pp. 1489-1500
[21] Chung, Kim-Sau (2000), "Role models and arguments for a¢ rmative action", American Eco-
nomic Review, 90(3), 640-648.
[22] Clark, D. A. (2009) "Adaptation, Poverty and Well-being: Some Issues and Observations with
Special Reference to the Capability Approach and Development Studies," Journal of Human
Development and Capabilities, 10 (1): 2142.
[23] Clark, J., R. Poulton and B. Milne (2003) "Bleak Expectations: The Role of Pessimism in
Smoking, Hazardous Drinking and Exercise," Working Paper 2003/03, Department of Eco-
nomics, University of Canterbury, Christchurch
[24] Clark A., P. Frijters and M. Shields (2008) Relative Income, Happiness and Utility: An
Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles, Journal of Economic Literature,
vol.46, no.1, pp.95-144.
[25] Cole S., T. Sampson and B. Zial (2009) "Money or Knowledge? What drives demand for
nancial services in emerging markets?" Harvard Business School Working Paper 09-117.
[26] Da Rin, M. and T. Hellmann (2002) Banks as Catalysts for Industrialization, Journal of
Financial Intermediation, 11, 366-397
36
[27] Dalton P. and S. Ghosal (2010) "Behavioral Decisions and Welfare," CentER Discussion Paper
2010-22, Tilburg University
[28] Dasgupta and Ray (1986) Inequality as a Determinant of Malnutrition and Unemployment,
The Economic Journal, 96, 1011-1034
[29] Deaton, A. (2001) Relative Deprivation, Inequality, and Mortality,National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Inc, NBER Working Papers: 8099
[30] Dickerson, S.S. and M.E.Kemeny (2004), "Acute stressors and cortisol responses: a theoretical
integration and synthesis of laboratory research", Psychological Bulletin, 130(3), 355-391.
[31] Dixon J. and D. Macarov (Eds) (1998) Poverty: a Persistent Global Reality, London; New
York: Routledge.
[32] Duclos, J-Y and G. Philippe (2002) Absolute and Relative Deprivation and the Measurement
of Poverty,Review of Income and Wealth, 48, 4, 471-92
[33] Duclos, J-Y, J. Esteban and D. Ray (2004) Polarisation: Concepts, Measurement, Estima-
tion,Econometrica, 72, 6, 17-37.
[34] Duncan, G.J., B. Gustafsson, R. Hauser, G. Schmauss, H. Messinger, R. Mu¤els, B. Nolan,
and J.C. Ray (1993), Poverty dynamics in eight countries,Journal of Population Economics,
6, 215-234
[35] Durlauf (2003) Groups, Social Inuences and Inequality: A Membership Theory Perspective
on Poverty Traps,University of Wisconsin, mimeo.
[36] Duo E. (2003) "Poor but rational," mimeo, MIT
[37] Easterlin, R. A. (2001) "Income and happiness: towards a unied theory," Economic Journal,
111, 465-84.
[38] Easterlin, R. A. (2005) "A puzzle for adaptive theory" Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, vol. 56, issue 4, pages 513-521
[39] Ellerman, D. (2002) "Autonomy-respecting assistance: Towards new strategies for Capacity
Building and development assistance," in: Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, Carlos Lopes and Khalid
Malik (eds.) Capacity for development. New solutions to old problems, London: Earthscan
Publications
37
[40] Elster, J. (1983) Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
[41] Festinger, L. (1954) "A theory of social comparison processes", Human Relations, 7: 117140.
[42] Field E., S. Jayachandran and R. Pande (2009) "Empowering Female Entrepreneurs in India?
A Field Experiment on Business Counseling," mimeo, Harvard University.
[43] Foster A. and M. Rosenzweig (1995) Learning by Doing and Learning from Others: Human
Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture,Journal of Political Economy, 103, 1176-1209
[44] Fouarge, D. and R. Layte (2003). Duration of Poverty Spells in Europe, EPAG Working
Paper 2003-47. Colchester: University of Essex.
[45] Frankenberger T. R., P. Sutter, A. Teshome, A Aberra, M. Tefera, M Tefera, A. S. Ta¤esse, T.
Bernard, T. Spangler and Y. Ejigsemahu (2007) "Ethiopia: the path to self-resiliency," report
prepared Partners in Rural Development on behalf Canadian Network of NGOs in Ethiopia,
July.
[46] Furnham A. (1986) "Economic Locus of Control," Human Relations, 39: 29.
[47] Galor O. and Zeira. J. (1993) Income Distribution and Macroeconomics,Review of Economic
Studies, 60, 35-52
[48] Genicot and D. Ray (2009) "Aspirations, Inequality, Investment and Mobility," mimeo.
[49] Gilbert, D., and J.E.J. Ebert (2002) "Decisions and revisions: The a¤ective forecasting of
changeable outcomes," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 503-514.
[50] Gilboa I. and D. Schmeidler (2001) A Theory of Case-Based Decisions, Cambridge University
Press, 210 pages.
[51] Goethals, G.R. and Darley, J. (1977). "Social comparison theory: An Attributional approach"
In J.M. Suls & R.L. Miller (Eds.), Social Comparison Processes: Theoretical and Empirical
Perspectives (pp. 259-278), Halsted-Wiley, Washington, DC.
[52] Graham B. S. and J. R. W. Temple (2004) Rich nations, poor nations: how much can
multiple equilibria explain?,The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion
Paper Series.
[53] Hardle W. (1990) Applied Non-parametric Regression, Oxford University Press.
38
[54] Heath C., R. P. Larrick and G. Wu (1999) Goals as reference Points, Cognitive Psychology
38, 79109
[55] Heifetz, A. and E. Minelli (2006) "Aspiration traps," mimeo.
[56] Helson, H. (1964) Adaptation-Level Theory: An Experimental and Systematic Approach to
Behavior. Harper and Row, New York.
[57] Ho¤ K and P Pandey (2004) Belief systems and durable inequalities: an experimental inves-
tigation of Indian caste,Policy Research Working Paper; no. 3351, The World Bank.
[58] Ho¤ K. and A. Sen (2005) The Kin System as a Poverty Trap?, forthcoming in Poverty
Traps, eds, Samuel Bowles, Steven Durlauf and Karla Ho¤, Princeton University Press., 2006
[59] Ho¤ner, C. and M. Buchanan (2005) "Young adults wishful identication with television
characters: The role of perceived similarity and character attributes," Media Psychology 7 ,
pp. 325-352.
[60] Jalan J. and M. Ravallion (1998) Determinants of Transient and Chronic Poverty. Evidence
from Rural China,Policy Research Working Paper No 1936, World Bank.
[61] Jensen R (2010) "The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling," The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125, 2, pp. 515-548
[62] Jensen R. and E. Oster (2009) "The Power of TV: Cable Television and Womens Status in
India" The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3), pp. 1057-94
[63] Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) "Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk"
Econometrica, 47, 263-291.
[64] Kannan, K. (2000) Poverty Alleviation as advancing basic human capabilities: Keralas
achievements compared,. In G. Parayil (Ed.) Kerala: The Development Experience (pp. 40-
65). New York. NY: Zed Books.
[65] Karandikar, D. Mookherjee, D. Ray and F. Vega-Redondo (1998) Evolving Aspirations and
Cooperation,Journal of Economic Theory 80, 292-331 (1998).
[66] Knight J. and R. Gunatilaka (2008) "Aspirations, Adaptation and Subjective Well-Being of
Rural-Urban Migrants in China," Economics Series Working Papers 381, University of Oxford,
Department of Economics.
39
[67] Kremer M. (1993) The O-ring Theory of Economic Development,Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, August, 551-575
[68] La Ferrara, E., A. Chong, and S. Duryea (2008), Soap Operas and Fertility: Evidence from
Brazil, BREAD Working Paper No. 172.
[69] Lant T. K. (1992) "Aspiration level adaptation: an empirical exploration," Management Sci-
ence, 38, 5, pg 623.
[70] Leitch R. (2006) "Prosperity for all in the global economy, world class skills" Leitch Review
of Skills: Final Report, HM Treasury on behalf of the Controller of Her Majestys Stationery
O¢ ce, 145 pgs.
[71] Locke E. A. and G. P. Latham (1990) A theory of goal setting and task performance, Prentice
Hall, N.J., 413 p.
[72] Lockwood, P., & Kunda, Z. (1997) "Superstars and me: Predicting the impact of role models
on the self" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 91-103.
[73] Loury G. (1981) Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings,Econometrica,
49, 843-867
[74] Nelson R. R. (1956) A Theory of The Low Level Equilibrium Trap,American Economic
Review, 46, 894-908
[75] Nguyen T. V. (2008) "Education and health care in developing countries," PhD Thesis, MIT,
Economics Department.
[76] MacLeod Jay (1995) Aint no makin it: Aspirations & Attainment in a Low-Income Neigh-
borhood, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.
[77] Macours K and R. Vakis (2009) "Changing householdsinvestments and aspirations through
social interactions: evidence from a randomized transfer program," World Bank Policy Re-
search Working Paper, No. 5137.
[78] Maier, N.R.F. (1961) Frustration: The Study of Behavior Without a Goal, University of Michi-
gan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
[79] Manski, C. E. (1995) Identication Problems in Social Sciences, Harvard University Press, 194
pgs.
40
[80] Marmot, M. and R. Wilkinson (Eds). (1999) Social Determinants of Health, New York: Oxford
University Press.
[81] Marx D.M. and P.A. Go¤ (2005) "Clearing the air: The e¤ect of experimenter race on targets
test performance and subjective," British Journal of Social Psychology, 44, 645657
[82] Marx D.M., S.J. Ko, R.A. Friedman (2009) "The Obama E¤ect: How a salient role model
reduces race-based performance di¤erences," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45,
953956
[83] McGregor D. (1960) The Human Side of Enterprise, McGraw Hill Higher Education, pp 256.
[84] Miguel E. and M. Kremer (2004) "Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in
the Presence of Treatment Externalities," Econometrica, 72(1), 159-217.
[85] Mookherjee D. (2003) Poverty Persistence and Design of Anti-Poverty Policies,forthcoming
in Banerjee, R. Benabou and D. Mookherjee (eds), Understanding Poverty, Oxford University
Press
[86] Moreira V. (2003) Poverty and Psychopathology,in Carr S. C. and Sloan T. S. (eds.) Poverty
and Psychology. From Global Perspective to Local Practice, Kluwer Academic/Plenun Publish-
ers New York.
[87] Mullainathan S. (2006) Development Economics through the lens of Psychology,mimeo.
[88] Oxoby R. J. (2004) "Cognitive dissonance, status and growth of the underclass," Economic
Journal,114, 498, pages 727-749
[89] Parducci, A. (1995) Happiness, Pleasure, and Judgment: The Contextual Theory and Its Ap-
plications. Erlbaum, Hillsdale.
[90] Poortinga, W., Dunstan, F.D., & Fone, D.L. (2008). "Health locus of control beliefs and
socio-economic di¤erences in self-rated health" Preventive Medicine, 46 (4), 374-380.
[91] Putnam R. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New
York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
[92] Quah D. T. (1993) Empirical cross-section dynamics in economic growth,European Eco-
nomic Review, 37, 426-434
[93] Quah D. T. (2005) Growth and Distribution,mimeo, LSE.
41
[94] Rabow J., Sherry L. Berkman and R. Kessler (1983) "The Culture of Poverty and Learned
Helplessness: A Social Psychological Perspective," Sociological Inquiry, 53, 4, 419-434.
[95] Ray, D. (2003) Aspirations, Poverty and Economic Change,in A. Banerjee, R. Benabou and
D. Mookherjee (eds) Understanding Poverty, Oxford University Press
[96] Rao, V. and M. Walton (2004) Culture and Public Action: Relationality, Equality of Agency,
and Development,in V. Rao and M. Walton (eds.), Culture and Public Action, The Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, Washington, DC.
[97] Rotter, J.B. (1954). Social learning and clinical psychology. New York: Prentice-Hall.
[98] Selten, R. (1998). "Aspiration Adaptation Theory." Journal of Mathematical Psychology 42
(2-3), 191-214.
[99] Sen, A. (2004) How Does Culture Matter?, in V. Rao and M. Walton (eds.), Culture and
Public Action, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank,
Washington, DC.
[100] Simon, H. (1955). "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice." The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 69 (1), 99-118.
[101] Silva, K; S. Scott; V. Totsika; K. Ereky-Stevens; C. Crook, (2008) "Training Parents to help
their children read: a randomized control trial," British Journal of Educational Psychology,78,
435-455
[102] Stark, O. and J.E. Taylor (1991) Migration Incentives, Migration Types: The Role of Relative
Deprivation,Economic Journal, 101, 408 1163-78
[103] Stark O (2006) Status Aspirations, Wealth Inequality, and Economic Growth, Review of
Development Economics, 10, 1, 171-176
[104] Stern N., J-J. Dethier and F. H. Rogers (2005) Growth and Empowerment. Making Devel-
opment Happen, Munich Lectures in Economics, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
and London, England.
[105] Stutzer, A. (2004) "The role of income aspirations in individual happiness," Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior & Organization, vol. 54(1), pages 89-109
[106] Torvik R. (1993) Talent, growth and Income Distribution, Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics, 95, 4, 581-596.
42
[107] Walker, K A. (1997), The Aspirations formation of disadvantaged jamaican men youths,"
PhD dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Virginia, January.
[108] Wilson, W. J., (1987), The Truly Disadvantaged, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[109] Wood, J.V. (1989). "Theory and research concerning social comparisons of personal attributes"
Psychological Bulletin, 106, 231-248.
[110] World Bank (1998) Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesnt and Why?,World Bank
Policy Research Report, Oxford University Press.
[111] World Bank (2002) Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook, preliminary draft,
pp. 280.
Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1:
By continuity of u(a; g) in a and by the compactness of A, a(g) is non-empty. For a0  a and
g0  g, note that
[u (a0; g)  u (a; g)]  [u (a0; g)  u (a; g)]
=
Z
2
[p(; a0)  p(; a)] [b (; g0)  b (; g)] d  0:
The rst equality follows by computation. The second inequality follows from the assumption that
p(; a0) rst order stochastically dominates p(; a) and b (; g) satises increasing di¤erences in ; g.
By continuity a(g) is non-empty and as payo¤s satisfy increasing di¤erences in (a; g), it follows
that there exists a maximal and minimal element in a(g) which is increasing in g.
As p(; a0) rst order stochastically dominates p(; a) for a0  a, (a) is increasing in a. Therefore,
by Tarskis x point theorem, B is non-empty and there exists a maximal and minimal element in
B.
Proof of Proposition 2:
By denition, (a; g), for all a0 2 A, u(a; g)  u(a0; g) for g = (a). By (C), for all a0 2 A,
u(a; g)  u(a0; g0), g0 = (a0). It follows that (a; g) 2 M . Next, suppose, by contradiction,
(a; g) 2 M but (C) doesnt hold. As (a; g) 2 B, for all a0 2 A, u(a; g)  u(a0; g) for g = (a).
As, by assumption, (C) doesnt hold there exists a0 2 A such that u(a; g)  u(a0; g) but u(a; g) <
u(a0; g0), g0 = (a0). But, then, (a; g) =2M , a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
Note that at a standard solution it is the case that
0 =
(  R
2 @ap(; a^)b (; g^) d
  @ac(a^)
+
 R
2 p(; a^)@gb (; g^) d
  R
2 @ap(; a^)d
 )
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while the "rst order condition" characterizing a behavioral solution is equivalently,
0 =
Z
2
@ap(; a
; 0)b (; g) d

  @ac(a; 0)

and
g =
Z
2
p(; a)d

Clearly, in this setting, condition (C) is equivalent to requiring that
0 = f@gu(a; g)@a(a)g
or equivalently,
0 =
Z
2
p(; a)@gb (; g) d
Z
2
@ap(; a
)d

an equality that cannot hold in our model under assumption 1 is satised. 
Proof of Proposition 4:
Under assumption 3(i), p(; a; 0) satises increasing di¤erences in a; 0. Under assumption 3(ii),
c(a; 0) satises decreasing di¤erences in a; 0. It follows, by computation, that if either assumption
3(i) or assumption 3(ii) holds
u
 
a0; g; 00
  u  a; g; 00  [u (a0; g; 0)  u (a; g; 0)]  0:
and 
 
a; 00
   (a; 0). Therefore, the maximal and minimal element in B (0) are increasing in
0. 
Proof of Proposition 5:
For simplicity we prove the proposition under assumption 3(ii) (a symmetric argument would
hold under assumption 3(i)). For each action an let
gn =
Z
2
p(; an)d:
By rst order stochastic dominance note that gn < gn+1, n = 0; 1; :::; N   1. Dene a sequence
f~gk (0) : 0  k  Kg where for each k  1, k < K, ~gk (0) solves the equationZ
2
p(; ak+1)b (; g) d   c (ak+1; 0)
=
Z
2
p(; ak)b (; g) d   c (ak; 0) :
with ~g0 (0) =  and ~gK (0) = . Observe that under assumption 2 and 3, as c (a; 0) satises
decreasing di¤erences in a; 0, the right hand side of the equation (derived by re-arranging terms in
the preceding equation) Z
2
(p(; ak+1; 0)  p(; ak; 0)) b (; g) d
= c (ak+1; 0)  c (ak; 0) :
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is decreasing in 0. Therefore, ~gk (0) is decreasing in 0 for each k  1, k < K.
By construction, note that for each k such that (ak; gk) is a behavioral solution, (i) g0 2
(~gk 1 (0) ; ~gk (0)), u (ak; g0; 0) > u (a; g0; 0) for all a 2 A so that ak is the unique best response
and (ii) gk 2 (~gk 1 (0) ; ~gk (0)). Therefore, (~gk 1 (0) ; ~gk (0)) is the basin of attraction of the
behavioral decision outcome (ak; gk). Then if g0 2 (~gk 1 (0) ; ~gk (0)), the individual will choose ak
and there will end up with an aspiration level gk i.e. the behavioral decision (ak; gk). Therefore,
the probability with which the internal constraint binds is equal to the probability that g0 is not
in the basin of attraction of the behavioral decision (aK ; gK) which, in turn, is the probability that
g0 < ~gK 1 (0) which is F (~gK 1 (0)).
As ~gK 1 (0) is decreasing in 0, the probability that internal constraint binds, F (~gK 1 (0)),
is decreasing in 0. Therefore, the lower is the initial status of the individual the greater is the
probability that the internal constraint binds and in a behavioral decision.
By a simillar argument, note that ~g0 (0) is decreasing in 0, the probability that internal con-
straint binds, F (~g0 (0)), is decreasing in 0. Therefore, the lower is the initial status of the individual
the lower is the probability that the DM will choose a1 and aspire g1 = 0 i.e. choose, and aspire,
to perpetuate her initial status and be stuck in a behavioral poverty trap. 
Proof of Proposition 7:
Suppose the initial distribution of status is globally dense. Then, by construction, the society
is strongly connected. Consider an individual i located at i0 choosing a = a with aspiration level
 = 0. Now suppose there is one individual with k with pk  p^

k0

. This individual k will
choose a = a. Moreover, as the society is strongly connected, there is a nite chain linking k to
every other individual j, j 6= k i.e. there is a nite chain of individuals i0; i1; :::; in^ with i0 = k
and in^ = j such that in belongs to the cognitive neighborhood of in+1, n = 0; :::; n^   1. Therefore,
each in, n = 0; :::; n^, chooses a = a and aspiration level  = 0. It follows that if there exists one
individual k with pk  p^

k0

, all individuals will choose a. More generally, the probability that all
individuals will choose all individuals in it choose a is maxk2N 1 G(p^

k0

) where G(:) is the cdf
that determines the initial beliefs p of any one individual in the society. 
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